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COUNTERFACTUAL SUCCESS AGAIN:
RESPONSE TO CARTER AND KRAMER
KEITH DOWDING AND MARTIN VAN HEES
We would like to thank Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer for their
challenging reply to our recent article. Dowding and van Hees (2007) is
one of a series of articles in which we try to address measurement issues
with regard to individual freedom. Our aim is to provide a conception
of freedom that will eventually yield a way of measuring the relative
freedom of groups of people within a society and a relative measure of
freedom across societies. In doing so, we draw upon the important work
of Carter (1999) and Kramer (2003), but as should be clear, we also depart
from it in several respects.
1. TEMPORAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCIES
We have argued that the “pure negative conception” of freedom embraced
by Carter and Kramer fails to be what it is supposed to be: a value-neutral
conception of freedom. They say that supporters of the “pure negative”
conception of freedom advocate “that a person is unfree to x if and only
if he is prevented from x-ing by the conduct or dispositions of some
other person(s)” (Carter and Kramer 2008: 81, we change their “ϕ” to
“x” for consistency in our article). The definition is said to be value-neutral
because preferences do not enter into either (a) the characterization of x
(individual i’s evaluation of the worth of x); or (b) the characterization
of the manner in which x-ing could be constrained (any way in which
another person’s act affects our negative freedom). In our article we argue
that though preferences do not seem to enter the characterization of x or of
its constraints, application of the definition to a class of situations shows
that an individual i’s evaluation of the worth of x determines i’s negative
freedom.
Carter and Kramer argue that pure negative theorists only need to
characterize x-ing as not having direct preference-dependence, but can
happily admit it having indirect preference-dependence. In one of our
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book examples i’s freedom is dependent upon i’s preferences and, since j’s
preferences are dependent upon i’s, i’s freedom is also dependent upon his
own preferences. Carter and Kramer make much of the first dependence
not being relevant to negative liberty; it is not clear why they do so, in
our account it sets up the discussion of the second dependence. Kramer
and Carter object that our examples rely on the second dependence being
indirect. Indirect-preference dependence is when a person’s preference
change causes something else in the world to change and it is that
alteration in the world that affect the person’s freedom. Direct preference
change is when a person’s preferences themselves influence his freedom.
In this argument they have given up the conceptual-causal distinction
that had motivated their previous defence (Kramer 2003: 190; Carter
in conversation). However, it is not as clear as they imagine that their
distinction is a critique of our counter-examples. The toy games by
which we examine how an individual i’s preference change affects i’s
freedom are static games of complete information and not the dynamic
games of incomplete information they seem to imagine. Their temporal
interpretation not only yields different games, but different types of games.
Of course, if Ami is no longer in a position to stop Fred from doing x then he
is free to do x. So what? What matters is whether our example demonstrates
different ascriptions of freedom for Fred under different preferences. The
correct temporal interpretation of our games is that if an agent at time t0
with preference x has freedom described by F does his freedom change
when his preference changes (from x to y) at time t0? We are discussing
a counterfactual alteration of preference, not a temporal change of mind.
Our argument is not aimed at elucidating the temporal dependence of
freedom on desires. Indeed, such an exercise would be rather trivial.
Given that we describe a counterfactual and not a temporal change
in preference, can the arguments of Carter and Kramer against a direct
dependence be used against our account? That is, are they right in rejecting
our claim that “one can lose a freedom simply because one’s preferences
have changed” (Dowding and van Hees, 2007: 21)? Carter and Kramer
indeed reject this claim but they do so on the basis of a mistaken view
about how to analyse counterfactuals. To see why counterfactuals are
important, note that on our account as well as on Carter’s and Kramer’s,
counterfactuals determine whether a person possesses a certain kind of
freedom: for establishing whether a person is free to x, we must examine
what happens if the person sets out or attempts to x. Now the actions
that people take are based on a social web of beliefs, desires, intentions
and information they receive from others, that constitute their and others’
dispositions. How people act and interact together are based upon these
webs. What people can and cannot do is often based upon what they
believe they are able to do; and how they think others will react to
them. A counterfactual analysis requires us to take into account these
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dispositional webs and the “can” of what people “can” do should not
simply be viewed in the physicalist terms of bars, ropes and handcuffs.
“Can is constitutionally iffy”, and the can of negative freedom needs a
careful counterfactual analysis.
To spell out the difference between our counterfactual analysis and
the one (implicitly) used by Carter and Kramer in their rejection of the
possibility of a direct dependence between freedom and preferences,
suppose it so happens that some i is not free to x and has no desire to x. To
show that there may be a preference-dependence – that is, to show that i’s
unfreedom depends on i’s desire – we argue that for a class of situations
the counterfactual statement “If i were to desire x, he would be free to x”
is true. Carter and Kramer now state the pure negative theorist’s question
as follows: “If a person’s preferences have undergone some change, and if
nothing else in the world has altered, can the person’s freedoms have been
affected by the change in her preferences?” (Carter and Kramer, 2008: 83).
The mistake they make is to assume that the truth of a counterfactual is
determined by the nature of the world in which, apart from the truth of
the antecedent (i.e. “i” desires to x) nothing else has altered. However, on
the standard, Lewisian view used by us, a counterfactual is true if the
consequence (“i is free to x”) is true in the possible worlds that are closest
to the actual world in which the antecedent is true. Given the dispositional
webs described in our toy examples, the nearest possible world in which
i’s preferences have changed are, by assumption, worlds in which the
actions of the others have changed as well, and that change results in
the loss of the freedom in question. It is on the basis of this standard
view about the nature of counterfactual analysis that we can indeed
say that “one can lose a freedom simply because one’s preferences have
changed”.
Once it is realized that the temporal interpretation of our analysis
is inappropriate, it can quickly be seen that the arguments that
Carter and Kramer put forward to defend the unavoidability and the
unobjectionability of such a temporal (i.e. indirect) preference-dependence
has no bearing on our analysis. But will the arguments also hold
under the right, counterfactual interpretation of the dependence that we
established?
Consider, first, Carter’s and Kramer’s claim that our intention-
based adaptation of negative freedom is also vulnerable to preference-
dependencies. Now, contrary to what Carter and Kramer claim (84),
we did not attempt to formulate a conception of freedom that avoids
preference-dependencies altogether. As we made clear (158), we believe
that our adaptation of the negative freedom conception will reduce rather
than prevent the occurrence of such dependencies. However, though the
example provided by Carter and Kramer thus forms a counterexample
to a claim we do not make, it is interesting to examine their example in
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somewhat more detail. When analysed in terms of counterfactuals, it can
be seen to be based on the above-discussed mistaken conception of the
truth conditions of counterfactuals.
They discuss two variations, Games 5 and 6, of our Fred–Ami book
example and conclude that under our account there is also a preference-
dependence. However, the argument fails under the correct counterfactual
interpretation of dependencies. To see why, consider their claim that in
Game 5 Ami will not have the intention to prevent Fred if he were to
attempt to get the book. This claim is based on the assumption that, in
Game 5, Ami predicts that Fred will not get the book and that Ami will
therefore not try to prevent him. Now this conclusion is only warranted if,
in the nearest possible world in which Fred tries to get the book, Ami will
not prevent him from doing so. However, in that nearest possible world
Fred will have different preferences than the ones specified in Game 5;
to analyse Fred’s freedom in that world we need to analyse a game in
which Fred does have a desire to buy the book. Since we can assume that
in nearest possible worlds the game is still one of complete information,
we can expect, given Ami’s primary desire of Fred not getting the book,
that Ami will thwart Fred’s attempt. In both games Fred is not free to read
the book: there is no preference-dependence.
Next consider their argument for the irrelevance of Berlin’s rejection of
the concept of stoic freedom for a temporal freedom-dependence. Again we
ask whether their argument can also be applied to the right interpretation
of the dependence, that is, to the counterfactual one. They distinguish
two scenario’s. The first is the one in which a person P is currently being
prevented by an oppressor Q to perform some set of actions but, if he
would have no desire to perform the actions in question, would be said
to be free even though there are no other changes in his situation (in
particular, he is still prevented from performing the actions). In the second
scenario the situation is the same except for the fact that the oppressor
would lift the obstacles if P would change his desires. Carter and Kramer
argue that the change in the second situation constitutes a “real liberation”
contrary to the “sham liberation” of the first situation. We concur if this
is to be read as a normative statement saying that the latter change
is more important rather than as an ontological argument about what
freedom “really” is. However, note that the preference-dependence that
we pointed out lies in-between these two situations. For those cases, it
is not clear that the acquired freedom constitutes less of a “real” than a
“sham” liberation. Indeed, as Carter and Kramer mention in footnote 3
of their comment, in cases in which the existence of prevention on Q’s
side is conditional upon P’s desires – as is in the case in our Fred–Ami
example – “P’s freedom is much more precarious than it would be if Q had
an unconditional disposition to prevent P from x-ing” (92, fn 3, italics
added).
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2. FREEDOM’S NON-SPECIFIC VALUE
To address their final remarks we need to go beyond our article itself a
little and back to their original accounts of the valuation and measurement
of freedom. Our response is made harder by the fact that our critics are
two authors who do not have precisely the same views on these issues
themselves. Carter, Kramer and ourselves agree that the non-specific value
of a particular freedom (or of overall freedom) should not be related to the
specific value of that particular freedom (overall freedom).1
With respect to particular freedoms, the point can be put in another
(essentially equivalent) way by saying that the utility a person gains
from enjoying a particular freedom, should not contribute to that
particular freedom’s non-specific value. Carter and Kramer believe
that this rules out direct preference-dependence of the property on
which the nonspecific value of freedom supervenes. Their concern is
that the preference dependence will contaminate the measure of non-
specific value. However, the preference-dependence we identify and
the importance of the intentions of constrainers merely affects which
particular freedoms belong to a person’s opportunity set. It does not
affect the measurement of those freedoms in terms of their non-specific
value.
Next consider overall freedom. For Carter the non-specific value of
overall freedom supervenes entirely on the sheer quantity of alternatives
available. He identifies that sheer quantity with overall freedom, and the
non-specific value is assumed to be a (weakly monotonic) function of the
levels of overall freedom. For Kramer too adding alternatives can never
decrease the non-specific value of freedom, however, his measure is “partly
evaluative” since additional freedoms in an opportunity set are weighted
1 Carter and Kramer (2008: 16) suggest we have mistaken the specific non-specific distinction
because we have ignored Kramer’s tripartite classification between (1) the non-specific
value of any freedom-to-x, (2) the specific value of any freedom-to-x, and (3) the value of
x-ing. They claim that the “way to capture the idea of freedom’s non-specific value is . . .
through a more abstract consideration of the mere fact of having freedom – that is, through
a perception of the value of freedom as such” (93). However, our example of non-specific
value of freedom of expression was merely to illustrate the nature of non-specific value.
Contrary to what Carter and Kramer argue in their response, it is an example of a particular
freedom having non-specific value. On Carter’s original definition a “phenomenon x has
non-specific value (. . .) if, and only if, the value of x cannot be described wholly in terms of
a good brought about or contributed by a specific instance of x or set of specific instances
of x” (Carter, 1999: 34). To illustrate the notion thus defined, we argued that the value of
having freedom of expression cannot be entirely reduced to its instances, that is, to either
the actual acts of expressing one’s opinions or to the various specific tokens of this freedom
type.
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dependent upon the freedoms already there in order to take account of
diversity considerations.2
It is not clear why non-specific value should be a (weakly) monotonic
function. The non-specific value of any particular freedom might derive
from a number of sources. Having freedom might instrumentally increase
the welfare of society for example, and it might originate in the effects
freedom has on the mental state of a person. Let us take the latter source.
We might conjecture that having a large set of alternatives from which to
choose fosters well-being, feelings of control, autonomy and so on. These
factors (which might also be termed ‘process utility’) constitute a source
of freedom’s non-specific value.
However, continually adding alternatives to an opportunity set might
not continually increase that person’s process utility. Rather, as is well-
known (Schwartz, 2004) too many alternatives can have psychological
costs. Some decisions are stressful, and having to make too many trivial
choices could be irritating. Stated differently, some increases of one’s
overall freedom (sheer quantity of alternatives) will lead to a decrease
in this kind of non-specific value.3 The example shows that we cannot
simply assume that an increase in the extent of one’s freedom can never
lead to a decrease of the (net) non-specific value of that freedom. Carter
and Kramer’s claim that the non-specific value of freedom supervenes
(positively) on the amount of overall freedom one enjoys is thus in
desperate need of empirical underpinning.
Both Carter and Kramer take the pure concept of negative freedom as
given and then argue that their measurement of freedom captures its non-
specific value. We think Carter’s argument unconvincing since it can be
doubted whether his measurement of freedom does indeed capture its non-
specific value. We think that Kramer’s argument is questionable as well
but for a different reason: his measurement of freedom is unconvincing
as a measurement of pure negative freedom. Rather than adjusting one’s
measurement of freedom so that it reflects freedom’s non-specific value,
we believe it is more worthwhile examining whether one’s definition of
freedom does a better job of capturing freedom’s non-specific value. Our
normative criterion for judging a conception of freedom comes into play
here. If freedom is something that people care about, have laid down their
lives in the name of, and if a particular definition turns out on inspection
to provide a definition that cannot explain why that is the case, then that
2 We think he considers it partly evaluative because his measure does not include the specific
value of freedom, however, nor do all other evaluative measures, for example, Klemisch-
Ahlert, 1993; Pattanaik and Xu, 2000; Bossert et al., 2003.
3 Clearly, there may be other forms of non-specific value that counterbalance such a negative
effect but this is not necessarily so.
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is a strong count against it as a conception of freedom.4 We believe the
intention-adapted version of the negative freedom concept does indeed
do a better job in this respect. If Carter and Kramer are criticizing us for
not having given the argument for that claim, then they are absolutely
right in doing so. That, however, was not the thrust of our paper. We tried
to show that Carter’s and Kramer’s conceptions of freedom fail on their
own account – not, yet, to give a full-fledged theory of our own.
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